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The period from 1870-1920 was a turning point in modern history. It was during this
time that the contours of the modern industrial state were formed. A “Great Merger
Movement” occurred right in the middle of this period across most of the industrialized
nations of the world. The trend toward industrial concentration, which was known at the
time as the “trust problem,” generated considerable public alarm. Some have argued that
it was caused by antitrust policy and the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions.
Indeed, the idea has become the conventional wisdom among some antitrust scholars,
especially those connected with the law and economics movement, and it has contributed
to a growing skepticism about the efficacy of antitrust law more generally. This article
analyzes the development of the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence from E.C.
Knight through Swift and attempts to offer a more balanced overview of the interplay
between the economic transformation that occurred around the turn of the twentieth
century and the formative developments in American antirust law. From this perspective,
both the merger movement and the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions were
responses to the same underlying economic forces. There is little, if any, reason to
believe that the Supreme Court’s decisions actually caused the Great Merger Movement.
In fact, the Court’s decisions were considerably more coherent than some scholars have
recognized. One of the unfortunate consequences of all the attention that has been
devoted to the effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions on industrial concentration is that
it has distracted attention from the role that the decisions played in the development of
constitutional doctrine. The economic forces that created the trust problem also
compelled the Supreme Court to extend the scope of federal commerce powers and bring
a wide range of new business activities within the reach of federal regulations. Ironically,
the same Court that handed down Lochner also laid the foundations of the modern
American system of business regulation.
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The trouble with all explanations of historical causes is the absence of
qualification: you can never say how much of the given cause was
necessary to provide how much effect, or how much of the cause there
was.
Oliver Wendell Holmes1

I. INTRODUCTION
The period from 1870-1920 is widely regarded as a turning point in modern
history. Indeed, the industrial and technological developments that occurred during this
period were so important and wide-sweeping that many historians have characterized
them as constituting the “Second Industrial Revolution.”2 This major industrial and
technological transformation occurred in conjunction with wide-ranging changes in the
social, political, and legal institutions of most of the industrialized world. With the acuity
of hindsight, we can now see that it was during this time that the contours of the modern
industrial state began to emerge as governments and private actors grappled with the new
problems raised by the modern industrial economy and as the social, political, and legal
institutions began to congeal around the solutions they devised.
An enormous wave of industrial mergers occurred in the center of this important
transitional period across most, if not all, of the then industrialized nations of the world -a wave that was so large and ubiquitous that it has become known as the “Great Merger

1

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Sept. 24, 1904), in HOLMES-POLLOCK

LETTERS, at 118 (Mark DeWolfe ed., 1941).
2

See, for instance, THOMAS PARKE HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF

INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIAM, 1870-1970 (1989).
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Movement.”3 The Great Merger Movement was more pronounced in some nations than
others, and induced varying social and legal responses, but it was significant enough to
raise serious concerns – and, in many cases, alarm – in most of Western Europe and
North America. At the time, many observers believed that the mergers were a natural
consequence of the ongoing industrial developments.

Many also believed that the

mergers were themselves shaping the direction and pace of industrial developments, and
feared the social and political consequences. But there was widespread confusion and
disagreement at the time both about the causes of the Great Merger Movement, and about
the appropriate ways for government to respond.
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 and the first Supreme Court decisions
interpreting its scope and legal effect were handed down before 1900. The foundations
of the modern American system of competition law and business regulation were thus
laid in the midst of the tumult and turmoil of the Second Industrial Revolution and the
confusion and controversy surrounding the Great Merger Movement. It is clear that we
cannot understand the origins of the complex web of federal and state laws that define the
modern American system of business regulation without understanding the context in
which it developed. But it is equally clear that the legal developments at the turn of the
twentieth century themselves played an important part in the emergence of the modern
industrial economy, and, in attempting to unravel the twines, it has been difficult to
separate cause and effect.

3

The origins of the term “Great Merger Movement” are unclear, although NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE

GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985) certainly deserves
much of the credit for popularizing it.
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Some writers – primarily law and economics scholars -- have theorized that the
Great Merger Movement was caused by the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court’s early
antitrust jurisprudence.4 In their view, the Supreme Court unwittingly caused the mergers
by interpreting the Sherman Act to make price-fixing agreements illegal, while at the
same time also holding that consolidations were beyond its reach. Instead of restraining
cooperation through price-fixing agreements, therefore, firms chose to consolidate. This
theory has been enormously influential on the economics profession and has helped to
color the views of many antitrust scholars, particularly those associated with the law and
economics movement. In some circles, it has become the accepted wisdom of antitrust
scholarship. Indeed, some well-known antitrust casebooks and reference materials cite
the theory without even mentioning any of the alternative hypotheses.

4

5

The theory is often attributed to George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger

Wave? 28 J.L. & ECON. 77 (1985), although Bittlingmayer himself does not take credit for the idea.
Indeed, a careful reading of Bittlingmayer’s article reveals that he clearly understood the complexities and
nuances surrounding the Great Merger Movement and that his evaluation of the evidence in favor of the
theory was quite guarded. While it is certainly not true that every law and economics scholar subscribes to
this view, it is probably fair to say that it has become the conventional wisdom among law and economics
scholars.
5

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION

AND ITS PRACTICE 56 (1994) [“The period 1895-1905 witnessed an enormous wave of mergers, caused
in part by the Sherman Act itself. Many entrepreneurs believed that the Act would prohibit cartels but be
quite tolerant of tighter combinations involving asset acquisitions or holding companies”], and CHARLES
J.

GOETZ

&

FRED.

S.

McCHESNEY,

ANTITRUST

LAW:

INTERPRETATION

AND

IMPLEMENTATION 668 (1998) [“enforcement in antitrust’s early years focused more on price-fixing
than mergers….Indeed, one scholar argues persuasively that it was the government’s pursuit of price fixing

6

The view that the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions were so inconsistent
and incoherent that they caused an enormous wave of anticompetitive mergers has
contributed to a pervasive skepticism among many scholars about the efficacy of antitrust
law more generally.

Since the Great Merger Movement caused by far the most

significant discrete increase in the concentration of industry in American history,6 many
scholars understandably believe it is difficult to reconcile the initial consequences of the
Sherman Act with its purported objectives. Indeed, skepticism about the Sherman Act
has long and distinguished roots. Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, once famously
asserted that the Sherman Act was nothing more than “humbug based on economic
nonsense” and his general disapproval of antitrust law was well known.7 Many modern
scholars have expressed similar skepticisms.8
while paying less attention to mergers that actually the Great Merger Wave”].

Of course, neither

Hovenkamp nor Goetz and McChesney were attempting to present balanced studies of the Supreme Court’s
early antitrust jurisprudence or its consequences. Nonetheless, their comments illustrate the extent to
which the conventional view has insinuated itself into the thinking of some prominent antitrust scholars.
6
7

See LAMOREAUX, supra note 3.
Alfred S. Neely, A Humbug Based on Economic Ignorance and Incompetence, 1993 UTAH L.REV. 1

(1993).
8

See, for instance, D. ARMIENTANO, ANTITRUST MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY

FAILURE (1982) and Harold Demsetz, Dialogue, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 235-6 (H. Goldsmith, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds., 1974). Not everyone has agreed. Peter C.
Carstensen, for instance, described some of the prominent critics of antitrust as “nattering nabobs of
negativisim” for their broad claims that antitrust imposed efficiency costs on the economy. See Peter C.
Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact

of Antitrust on the American Economy: Examining History or

Theorizing, 74 IOWA L.REV. 1175 (1988-9).
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Some scholars have, however, recently made much more systematic and
sophisticated critiques of the motives for antitrust regulation as well as its ultimate
effects, and they have drawn on the conventional law and economics theory about the
Great Merger Movement to support their endeavors. McChesney and Shughart, for
instance, have attempted to recast the entire agenda of antitrust scholarship by bringing
together a series of articles that challenge its basic premises.9 One of the contributors to
their book, Bruce Yandle, summarizes a well-known article by George Bittlingmayer10
that presents the conventional law and economics view as establishing that “it was the
Sherman Act itself and its attack on beneficial cooperative arrangements that sparked the
merger wave”.11 McChesney and Shughart themselves summarize Bittlingmayer’s article
as showing how “the Great Merger Wave that dramatically increased industrial
concentration at the turn of the century, was in fact caused by antitrust enforcement.”12
Indeed, the view that the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions actually caused
significant anticompetitive behavior is the accepted wisdom among critics of antitrust law

9

As they explain, they seek not to ask “What should antitrust do? …[but instead]…What has antitrust

done, and why?”, and in their view, the answers undermine the legitimacy of antitrust enforcement. The
hallmark of success for their book will be whether it will “return the attention of antitrust scholars to first
principles, forcing them to consider seriously whether antitrust has any legitimate place in a market-based
economy”.

See FRED S. McCHESNEY & WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, THE CAUSES AND

CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST (1995).
10
11

Bittlingmayer, supra note 4.
Bruce Yandle, The Positive Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, in McCHESNEY & SHUGHART,

supra note 9 at 123.
12

McCHESNEY & SHUGHART, supra note 9 at 4.
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today.
The causes of the Great Merger Movement are therefore more than merely an
academic matter. And they are still open to serious debate. Although the conventional
law and economics view has the sheen of plausibility, a careful review of the evidence
reveals that it rests on an improbable reading of the Supreme Court’s early antitrust
decisions and dubious conjectures about their consequences. While there may be many
legitimate reasons for critiquing modern antitrust regulation, there is little reason to
believe that antitrust policy caused the Great Merger Movement.

Indeed, many

contemporary observers at the turn of the twentieth century viewed cause and effect from
almost exactly the opposite perspective. As they saw it, the Great Merger Movement was
a natural response to the business conditions that had driven a slough of earlier pricefixing and market-sharing agreements and was therefore part of the same “trust
problem.”13
13

Some leading modern economic and business historians agree. See, for instance, THOMAS McCRAW,

PROPHETS OF REGULATION 65-6 (1984) [‘The trust movement … grew out of … the problem of
periodic industrial overcapacity…progress in the technology of production far outran similar developments
in … consumer purchasing power…. The response among businessmen … was to combine with one
another in schemes designed to limit the total output of their plants, maintain the price levels of their goods,
and discourage the entry of new businesses].

Alternatively, see NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E.

BIRDZELL, HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRASNFORMATION FO THE
INDUSTRIAL WORLD 215 (1986) [Between 1880 and 1920, the United States was increasing its
industrial capacity and altering manufacturing technology in ways that required extensive replacements of
obsolete plants, often with plants of considerably greater size…. There was a serious need for new forms
of enterprise better able to attract capital…. The plausible expedients were tried many times: incorporation,
formation of trusts, and, after 1894, mergers, which peaked in 1900 or 1901. Although these produced

9

The novelty and unprecedented scale of manufacturers’ attempts to forestall
competition in the earliest phase of the trust movement during the 1880’s incited so much
public alarm that Congress was virtually compelled to respond. Congress’s response was
to enact the Sherman Act.14 The controversy surrounding the Great Merger Movement
then set the context in which successive administrations enforced the Act and in which
the Supreme Court ruled in early antitrust cases, but the correlation between those cases
and the mergers arose from their common roots in the problematic business conditions
that gave birth to the “trust problem,” not from the fact that the Supreme Court’s
decisions caused the mergers.
This essay attempts to offer a more balanced view of the interplay between
business conditions at the turn of the twentieth century and the formative developments
in American antitrust law. From this perspective, both the Great Merger Movement and
early American antitrust jurisprudence were, at their roots, responses to dramatic
technological changes and related business innovations that completely transformed the
economic foundations of American society in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s earliest antitrust opinions were hardly ill-informed blunders:
they were important decisions about the scope of the federal government’s powers and

many enterprises that failed, they also produced a number of large enterprises that proved able to raise the
capital required for reconstruction and expansion ...and a burgeoning American economy emerged from the
merger movement ready to take off on a second industrial revolution].
14

See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power 61 S.CAL.L.REV. 1219 (1988) for a

persuasive argument that the Sherman Act was a response to the widespread alarm over the growing
imbalance of power between the large, new corporations and the public interest in the late nineteenth
century.
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they played a pivotal role in establishing the legal framework for the modern American
system of business regulation. In this respect, the debate about whether the Supreme
Court’s early antitrust opinions caused the Great Merger Movement has only misdirected
our attention from the much more important role those opinions played in clarifying and
expanding the role of the federal government in the social and economic life of the nation
during the twentieth century.
The next section of this essay presents a summary of the conventional law and
economics view. The third section reviews the development of the Supreme Court’s
early antitrust jurisprudence, and argues that a careful reading of the cases reveals that the
Supreme Court’s decisions were considerably more consistent and coherent than some
critics have suggested.

Unless business firms grossly misunderstood their legal

implications, the Supreme Court’s decisions simply could not have had the effects that
many law and economics scholars have suggested. Indeed, a careful reading of the cases
reveals that the central issues had less to do with the interpretation of the Sherman Act
than they did with the scope of the federal government’s regulatory powers. The fourth
section draws on recent scholarship in economic and business history to offer an
alternative, and much more compelling, perspective on the social and economic
transformation that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century. From this vantage
point, the correlation between the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions and the Great
Merger Movement was largely coincidental. Both the trust movement and the Supreme
Court’s antitrust decisions were compelled by the same underlying technological and
economic forces. The fifth section concludes.
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIICS THESIS
The idea that important judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act caused an
upswing in merger activity at the turn of the nineteenth century has been around almost
since the mergers occurred.15 It has been refined and restated by a number of authors
since then, many of whom have relied on increasingly sophisticated theoretical and
empirical analyses to elaborate on the basic argument. The basic idea, however, is quite
simple and rooted in the notion of economies of scale and the obvious correlation
between the timing of certain Supreme Court antitrust decisions and the intensity of turnof-the-twentieth century merger activity.
The most compelling and well-known statement of the thesis was made by
George Bittlingmayer.16 Bittlingmayer’s articulation of the theory and evaluation of the
evidence is, however, far more sophisticated and nuanced than most subsequent authors
have acknowledged. As he explained, his “primary aim …[was merely]… to see whether
15

The roots of the idea reach back to comments made by contemporaneous observers. Tony Freyer. The

Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great
Britain 1880-1920, 74 IOWA L.REV. 991 (1989) asserts that “A leading contemporary lawyer observed
that for nearly a decade following the decision [E.C. Knight] lawyers generally believed that the holding
company and other forms of corporate merger were valid under the Sherman Act.”

The leading

contemporary lawyer that Freyer was referring to was probably Robert L. Raymond. See Robert L.
Raymond, The Federal Antitrust Act, 23 HARV.L.REV. 353 (1910). See also Gilbert Holland Montague,
The Defects in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 19 YALE L.J. 88, 90 (1909-10) or George F. Canfield, Is a
Large Corporation an Illegal Combination or Monopoly under the Sherman Antitrust Act? COL.L.REV.
95, 113 (1909). It is interesting to note that Montague was an economist at Harvard. The idea therefore
has deep roots in the economics profession as well as the legal profession.
16

Bittlingmayer, supra note 4.
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a reasonable theoretical foundation …[could]… be constructed for the view that changes
in antitrust policy caused the large year-to-year variations in merger activity that took
place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”.17 The first cornerstone of the
theoretical foundation that he laid was based on a postulate about antitrust policy:
According to Bittlingmayer, U.S. v E.C. Knight 156 U.S. 1 (1895) “made merger legal, at
least in the minds of many lawyers.”18 It presumably led prominent government officials
to believe that mergers were legal too, and, therefore, antitrust enforcement after E.C.
Knight was directed at price-fixing agreements rather than mergers.19
Bittlingmayer recognized that the theory requires some explanation why so many
business firms continued to participate in price-fixing cartels even after E.C. Knight was
handed down. His explanation was quite nuanced. As he points out, one obvious reason
why many business firms might have continued to cooperate through cartels instead of
merging, even after E.C. Knight, was because cartels were more profitable. As he
explained, “…firms will prefer cartels to mergers if the gains are greater. If there are
diseconomies from merger and if the available monopoly gains are not large, the
preferred choice may very well be cartelization”.20 In his view, however, this was still
too simplistic to explain the motives for cooperation in the late nineteenth century, and so
he offered an elaboration on the argument.
To begin with, he noted that competition in many manufacturing industries in the

17
18
19
20

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 127.
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late nineteenth century was problematic because significant new technologies had left
many business firms in situations where they could avail themselves of economies of
scale in production, but only by investing in new capital and expanding their facilities.
Unfortunately, if they had all tried to expand the scale of their production facilities
simultaneously, their aggregate productive capacity would have been much greater than
necessary to supply their markets and their prices would have fallen even more than their
average costs. This was at heart a problem of fixed costs: business firms had to sink
fixed costs in new plant and equipment or they would have become uncompetitive, yet if
they had all sunk investments in new plant and equipment none would have been able to
recoup an acceptable return. Thus, it was not so much the prospect of monopoly profits
that compelled them to cooperate as the need to seek respite from competition.21 They
initially sought to restrain competition through price-fixing and market-sharing
agreements because these offered a more efficient way of doing so than mergers.22
Bittlingmayer contends that E.C. Knight tipped the balance against from cartels
and in favor of mergers. He notes that E.C. Knight was immediately “followed by three
successive quarters of increased merger activity”.23 He also notes, however, that the
number of mergers per annum abated in 1896 and remained at a relatively modest level in
1897, before increasing dramatically in 1898 and 1899. This coincided almost exactly
21

Bittlingmayer’s description of the business conditions at the turn of the twentieth century accords with

the views of many contemporaneous observers as well as those of some leading economic and business
historians. See McCRAW, supra note 13 and ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 13.
22
23

In the end, Bittlingmayer’s explanation is more nuanced, but hardly any less tautological.
Bittlingmayer, supra note 4 at 133. Bittlingmayer’s merger data are from RALPH NELSON, MERGER

MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1895-1956 (1959).
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with the timing of U.S. v Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) and U.S. v
Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), which, according to Bittlingmayer, were the
first Supreme Court cases to make price-fixing illegal.24 Bittlingmayer notes that TransMissouri was announced in the first quarter of 1897 and that shortly thereafter merger
activity increased to “unprecedented levels.”25 Although the rate of merger activity
tapered off somewhat immediately before the circuit court of appeals’ decision in
Addyston Pipe,26 it surged with renewed vigor after the decision was announced.27
Bittlingmayer notes further that merger activity decreased substantially while U.S. v.
Northern Securities, was being litigated, and dropped off significantly after the decision
was announced.28
It would be entirely wrong to claim that the theory is without empirical support.
Indeed, figures compiled by Naomi Lamoreaux show that the number of consolidations
in the manufacturing sector rose from 4 in 1895 to a peak of 63 in 1899 before declining
again to 3 in 1904.29 Moreover, there is some anecdotal evidence that prominent business
attorneys may have actually advised their clients to restrain competition through mergers
rather than price-fixing cartels in the wake of E.C. Knight and Addyston Pipe.30 But there
24

Id. at 127. It is not at all clear, however, that the Supreme Court considered these to be simple price-

fixing cases. See the argument infra pp. 35-6.
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 133.
U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
Bittlingmayer, supra note 4 at 133.
Id. at 144.
LAMOREAUX, supra note 3 at 2.
See Freyer, supra note 15.
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is contradictory evidence as well.

In fact, the weight of the evidence against the

conventional law and economics view is growing. Moreover, a careful analysis of the
Supreme Court’s early antitrust cases brings into question any simple assertions about the
role they played in causing the Great Merger Movement.

III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EARLY ANTITRUST DECISIONS
As James W. Ely, Jr. aptly describes, “the Sherman Act was a compromise
written in ambiguous language that provided no guidance as to practical application.”31
As with all ambiguous statutes, therefore, it conferred significant discretionary authority
on the judiciary. The ambiguity inherent in the wording of the statute was not, however,
the primary cause of uncertainty about antitrust law in the first fifteen years after it was
enacted. What is most striking about the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions is that
they primarily addressed constitutional questions. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s early
antitrust decisions were a watershed in the history of American constitutional law that in
many ways laid the groundwork for the expansive role the federal government would
later take in regulating the social and economic life of the nation. Ironically, they were
decided by the same Court that launched the Lochner era in constitutional
jurisprudence.32 What is most fascinating of all is that some of the challenges to the
Sherman Act that the Supreme Court rejected in its early antitrust cases were based on

31

JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELLVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 128

(1995).
32

Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the same type of liberty of contract argument that the Court accepted in Lochner.33
Prior to the Sherman Act and similar state antitrust legislation, competition
between business firms was governed by the common law. Under the common law, only
those restraints that the courts determined to be unreasonable were invalid.34 Restraints
that accorded with the public interest were considered reasonable and therefore lawful.
There was no per se prohibition against price-fixing or other cartel agreements, and even
attempts to monopolize were generally valid as long as they fell short of actually
preventing or attempting to prevent other firms from competing in the same line of
business.35 The underlying principle was that the law needed only to protect the rights of
business owners to compete freely, not that it needed to protect the public from the
exercise of market power.36

The common law jurisprudence was in these respects

consistent with the priority that many jurists, academics, and elected officials placed on
private property rights, and the principles of the liberty of contract and laissez-faire
economics in the late nineteenth century.
33

In Lochner, of course, the liberty of contract argument was based on a Fourteenth Amendment right,

since the case involved a challenge to a state law. In the Sherman Act cases it was based on a Fifth
Amendment due process right, since the Act was a federal statute.
34

See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICAN: THE EVOLUTION OF

THE SHERMAN ACT 18-46 (1965).
35

As Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68

TEX.L.REV105, 130 (1989) notes several state courts in the late nineteenth century held price–fixing
agreements to be valid if the cartel members had acted on a legitimate fear of ruinous competition and
others accepted the ruinous competition defense in challenges to mergers.
36

MARTIN SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-
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Indeed, it was not at all clear when the Sherman Act was initially enacted whether
it would truly revise the common law antitrust standards.37 Given the Act’s ambiguous
wording, the only ways in which it clearly superseded the common law were by
establishing criminal penalties for certain antitrust violations, and allowing civil suits for
treble damages.38 It was far less clear whether the Act was intended to replace the
common law reasonableness standard with a stricter rule. Interestingly, Werner Troesken
has found that the passage of the Sherman Act had little, if any impact, on the trusts’
stock prices.39 If the Act had been widely expected to impose stricter standards on the
trusts’ allegedly anticompetitive practices, then their stock prices should have fallen.
Troesken argues that many observers felt the Sherman Act would have little effect.40 It is
no surprise, therefore, that the passage of the Sherman Act also appears to have done
little to abate the trend toward consolidation.

1916 105 (1988).
37
38
39

Id. at 105-6.
Id.
Werner Troesken, Did the Trusts Want a Federal Antitrust Law? An Event Study of State Antitrust

Enforcement and Passage of the Sherman Act, in Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic
History (J.C. Heckleman, J.C. Moorehouse, & R.M. Whaples, eds., 2000).
40

Werner Troesken, The Letters of John Sherman and the Origins of Antitrust, 15 THE REV. OF

AUSTRIAN ECON. 275, 290 (2002). Troesken cites, for example, an editorial in the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle on June 8, 1889 that expressed serious concerns about a new Missouri antitrust statute,
but noted that “In spite of the fact that the anti-trust bill [the Sherman Act] is now awaiting the President’s
signature, little importance seems to be attached to it, as the dealings in Trust stocks have been unusually
large this week, and prices in some cases have advanced greatly”.
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A.

U.S. v. E.C. Knight
The first serious challenge to a combination under the Sherman Act was not until

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In E.C. Knight the government alleged that
the American Sugar Company, under the direction of John Searles, Jr., violated the
Sherman Act by purchasing the stock, machinery, and real estate of its major four
competitors and thus “monopolized the manufacture and sale of refined sugar in the
United States, and controlled the price of sugar.”41 By the time the case came up before
the Supreme Court, both the circuit court and the circuit court of appeals had already
rejected the government’s case and held that the Sherman Act did not apply. It should
have come as no great surprise, therefore, when the Supreme Court also rejected the
government’s case.
Chief Justice Fuller wrote the majority opinion for the Court. His opinion did not
address whether the Sherman Act’s prohibition against “Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade...” should be interpreted
according to a rule of reason. It simply held that the Sherman Act was intended to apply
only so far as the federal government’s commerce powers allowed, that the activities at
issue in E.C. Knight involved the manufacture of sugar not commerce, and that regulatory
control over the manufacture of a product did not fall within the federal government’s
commerce powers. Thus, the Court strictly bifurcated all economic activities into two
categories: manufacturing and commerce. Manufacturing involved the “transformation
of raw materials into a change of form for use, …[whereas commerce involved]… the
buying and selling, and the transportation incidental thereto” (quoting Kidd v. Pearson,
41

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1895).
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128 U.S. 1. 20).

The implication was that the Sherman Act did not apply to any

contracts, combinations, or conspiracies involved only in the manufacture of a product.
In drawing such a sharp distinction between manufacturing and commerce, the Court
was, in fact, simply using the words as they were commonly understood in the nineteenth
century42 and in a manner consistent with its own precedents (see, in particular, Kidd).
Much of the commentary seems to presume that the legal effect of Knight was to
place all mergers beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, but to leave the question of its
application to price-fixing agreements and other arms-length restraints43 open to be
decided in future cases. This is not a logical reading of the case. First of all, the opinion
clearly placed any contract, combination, conspiracy, or other restraint against trade
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act if it involved only the manufacture of a good,
regardless of whether it involved a merger. Thus, any arms-length restraints between
competing business firms that extended only to the manufacture of their goods, and not to
their sale or distribution, would clearly have been beyond the reach of the Sherman Act
after E.C. Knight.
Second, any merger of competing business firms that were clearly engaged in
interstate commerce would have fallen within the reach of the Sherman Act, unless its
reach was limited by some other constitutional doctrine (such as the liberty of contract) or
by a rule of reason interpretation of the wording of the Sherman Act. Thus, a merger of
two competing interstate retailers or, perhaps more importantly for the time, two
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competing interstate railroad companies, would clearly have fallen within the reach of the
Sherman Act, assuming it was not immune by virtue of some other constitutional
argument. Of course, it was not clear whether the Sherman Act would have made such
mergers unlawful, since the Court left the interpretation of the Sherman Act’s wording
open to be decided in future cases.
Finally, although E.C. Knight drew a sharp line between manufacturing and
commerce, and held that manufacturing was not interstate commerce, it did not hold that
all commerce was interstate commerce. Logically, therefore, E.C. Knight implied that
any contracts, combinations, conspiracies, or other restraints of trade that extended only
to local commerce and not interstate commerce would also be beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act.
Some writers have made too much of E.C. Knight’s distinction between
manufacturing and commerce.44

As William Letwin has observed, Justice Fuller’s

opinion actually suggested that the real problem with the government’s case was the
manner in which it had tried to prove a violation of the Sherman Act.45 The government
attempted to prove its case merely by adducing evidence of a merger of manufacturing
plants.

If it had also adduced evidence of the direct effect of the merger on the

companies’ commercial activities, it might have defeated the constitutional challenge and
won the case. As Justice Fuller wrote, “there was nothing in the proofs [italics added] to
indicate any intention to put a restraint on trade or commerce, and the fact… that trade or

44
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commerce might be indirectly affected was not enough to entitle complainants to a
decree.”46 It is reasonable to surmise, therefore, that Justice Fuller’s opinion “depended
strictly on the facts of the case”47 and was not intended to construe the scope of the
Sherman Act as narrowly as some writers have suggested.
There is little, if any, evidence that contempo rary observers believed E.C. Knight
would make all mergers immune from antitrust prosecution. The New York Times
reported on the decision the day after it was announced in an article48 subtitled,
“Congress May Not Regulate Those Acts of Corporations Done Wholly Within A Single
State.” The article stated the holding accurately and quoted from the opinion at length.
Moreover, although the Times provided substantial coverage of the business and financial
news at the time, it did not subsequently print any articles that suggested E.C. Knight
caused an upswing in merger activity. Of course, even the clearest of opinions can be
subjected to ill-informed criticism, and so it was inevitable that some ambiguity about the
legal effect of the case would persist. Nonetheless, there was probably less confusion
about the legal effect of E.C. Knight than some writers have assumed. As Augustine L.
Hines succinctly summarized in the Harvard Law Review just after the turn of the
century, “nothing more was decided than that a monopoly of manufacture was not within
the statute [the Sherman Act] and, therefore, was not void”.49
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B.

U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) was the next Supreme

Court antitrust case. In Trans-Missouri, the government alleged that several competing
railway companies formed an association for the express purpose of maintaining
“reasonable rates, rules, and regulations on all freight traffic, both through and local”.50
The circuit court for the district of Kansas dismissed the complaint,51 and the circuit court
of appeals for the Eighth circuit affirmed.52 Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority
opinion for the Court, summarized the case as presenting two questions: “first, whether
the …[Sherman Act]… applies to and covers common carriers by railroad; and …second,
does the agreement set forth in the bill violate any provision of that act?”53
The response to the first question was a resounding “yes.” In its defense, TransMissouri Freight argued that railroad transportation was not interstate commerce, and
that, even if it was, it was exempted from the reach of the Sherman Act by the Interstate
Commerce Act. Of course, the fact that the federal government had already used the
Interstate Commerce Act to regulate the railroads undermined Trans-Missouri Freight’s
argument. Justice Peckham put the matter bluntly: “Railroad companies are instruments
of commerce, and their business is commerce itself.”54 If railroad companies engaged in
transportation across state lines, therefore, they were engaged in interstate commerce and
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U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 292 (1897).
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 53 F. 440 (C.C.D. Kans. 1892).
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 58 F. 58 (8th Cir. 1893).
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 311-12 (1897).
Id. at 312.

23

their activities would be within the reach of the Sherman Act.

This was perfectly

consistent with E.C. Knight as well as the prior Supreme Court cases construing railroad
companies as instruments of commerce.55
Trans-Missouri Freight argued further that, even if interstate railroad
transportation did fall within the scope of the federal government’s commerce powers,
the Interstate Commerce Act had authorized the agreement at issue and Congress could
not have intended to repeal that authorization through the Sherman Act.

More

specifically, since Congress must have been aware of agreements similar to the one that
involved Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, and since Congress did not explicitly repeal any
part of the Interstate Commerce Act when it enacted the Sherman Act, Congress must
have intended to exclude agreements of that type from the Sherman Act’s reach. In
response to this argument, Justice Peckham simply denied that the Interstate Commerce
Act had authorized agreements of the type the Trans-Missouri Freight’s Ass’n had made.
This was also completely uncontroversial.
Justice Peckham then turned to the second question: whether the Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n had violated the Sherman Act. Here the dispositive issue was whether the
wording of the Act would be construed according to its plain meaning, or whether it
would be construed against the backdrop of the common law, which had traditionally
applied a reasonableness standard in determining whether contracts in restraint of trade
were unlawful. As Peckham noted, the lower courts had proceeded on the theory that the
Sherman Act was intended to follow the common law, and had made an exhaustive
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investigation into the general rules which should guide courts in determining whether
contracts unreasonably restrain trade and therefore violate public policy.56 Peckham
observed, however, that even under the theory that Congress had not intended to supplant
the common law reasonableness standard, the railroad companies were still “public
corporations… [that had been]… granted valuable franchises and privileges…” to
provide services of a ‘public nature,’ 57 and for that reason “Congress… might… have
deliberately decided to prohibit all agreements and combinations in restraint of trade or
commerce [among railroad companies], regardless… whether such agreements were
reasonable”.58
Ultimately, however, further consideration of the matter was unnecessary,
because Peckham decided that the wording of the Sherman Act should be interpreted
literally. He argued that if a literal interpretation of the Act would result in the collapse
of the railroads, it was Congress’s responsibility to amend it.

In Peckham’s view,

“Congress may, and very probably did share in the belief… [that]… when the lawmaking
power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has constitutional power to
legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts.”59 Since there was no
doubt that the effect of the association’s agreement was to put a direct and immediate
restraint upon trade,60 and since the plain meaning of the Sherman Act made such
56
57
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restraints illegal, the matter was sealed.

Peckham dispensed with a few remaining

procedural matters and remanded the case back to the circuit court.
Peckham’s application of the plain meaning doctrine in Trans-Missouri was the
only truly novel legal development in the case.

The Court’s holding that railroad

companies that engaged in interstate transportation were involved in interstate commerce
and therefore within the reach of the Sherman Act was entirely predictable. The legal
effect of Trans-Missouri, therefore, was to imply that all contracts, combinations,
conspiracies, and other restraints of trade were illegal if they were between parties
involved in interstate commerce and therefore within the reach of the Sherman Act.
Presumable, this made all mergers between horizontal competitors involved in interstate
commerce illegal as well as all price-fixing agreements and other arms-length restraints
of trade. For some reason, however, many commentators have treated Trans-Missouri as
if it was merely a price-fixing case.

Indeed, some commentators have mistakenly

concluded that the legal effect of Trans-Missouri was to establish a per se rule against
price-fixing agreements.61 It is important to emphasize that Trans-Missouri clearly did
not extend the reach of the Sherman Act to restraints of trade in local commerce and so
price-fixing agreements would still have been legal (assuming they were not in violation
of a state law) as long as they did not affect interstate commerce. This is hardly an
academic point, as the next case illustrates.
the reach of the Court’s holding, but it is interesting that he subsequently used the same words to qualify
the Court’s holding in U.S. v Joint Traffic Ass’n 171 U.S. 505 (1998). See the discussion infra.
61
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C.

Hopkins v. U.S.
On the same day that the Supreme Court announced its decision in its next famous

antitrust case, U.S. v. Joint Traffic Ass’n 171 U.S. 505 (1898), it also announced its
decision in a much less well-known case: Hopkins v. U.S., 171 U.S. 578 (1898). Joint
Traffic is usually regarded as an important further step in the Supreme Court’s early
antitrust jurisprudence, but Hopkins usually goes overlooked.

That is unfortunate,

because Hopkins helps to put both Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic in a clearer focus.
Hopkins involved a suit against members of the Kansas City Livestock Exchange
(including Henry Hopkins), which alleged that some of the rules governing the exchange
were intended to restrain trade and create a monopoly. The suit alleged that members of
the exchange refused to trade with nonmembers, and forced livestock owners who would
not trade through exchange members to ship their livestock elsewhere, in order to sustain
exorbitant commissions.
Justice Peckham once again wrote the majority opinion. He began by noting that
the Sherman Act prohibited only restraints of trade in interstate commerce. Peckham
noted further that the Kansas City Livestock Exchange operated in Kansas City and its
members were in the business of buying and selling livestock only as commission
merchants. In his view, therefore, the nature of the defendants’ business needed to be
determined entirely from their activities in Kansas City.62 He then asked whether the
members of the exchange, in acting as commission merchants in Kansas City for out of
state livestock owners, could be said to be engaged in interstate commerce. His answer:
62
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“We think not. On the contrary, we regard the services as collateral to such commerce;
…and an agreement among those who render the services… is not a contract in restraint
of interstate trade or commerce.”63
Peckham elaborated by attempting to draw the line between restraints of trade in
interstate and local commerce. He argued that, while the sale of an article that has been
sent into the state from another state might be regarded as an interstate sale, the services
of a commission merchant involved in the sale should not be considered a part of
interstate commerce. As he explained, “Charges for services of this nature do not
immediately touch or act upon, nor do they directly affect, the subject of the
transportation…. [T]hey may enhance the cost to the owner of the cattle in finding a
market, or they may add to the price paid by a purchaser, but they are not charges which
are directly laid upon the article”.64 In Peckham’s view, the Sherman Act condemned
only those restraints of trade whose direct and immediate effect was upon interstate
commerce, and to condemn restraints of trade in the provision of services which were
only collateral to interestate commerce “would enlarge the application of the act far
beyond the fair meaning of the language used.”65
Having dispensed with the suit on commerce clause grounds, Peckham declined
to address the defendants’ liberty of contract challenge to the suit or the substance of the
allegations.

Hopkins is important nonetheless because it clearly illustrates that the

definition of interstate commerce by the Fuller Court was not simply “everything other
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than manufacturing,” and that there was, in fact, an important distinction between local
and interstate commerce that potentially placed many other types of business activities
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. In this light, it is simply wrong to think that the
Sherman Act provided a per se rule against price-fixing after Trans-Missouri. Since the
line between restraints of trade that directly affected interstate commerce and those
merely collateral to it was less than crystal clear, in many cases it may not have been
obvious whether Trans-Missouri made a particular price-fixing agreement illegal. In
some cases, business firms that were parties to price-fixing agreements may have
wondered whether they might too have been able to convince a court that their activities
were only collateral to, and therefore not in direct restraint of, interstate commerce.
It is interesting how little attention Hopkins received in comparison to the Court’s
decision in Joint Traffic, which was announced on the same day.66 This is probably in
some part because the Court’s decision in Hopkins was completely consistent with its
earlier holding in E.C. Knight, but it is probably in larger part because railroad
competition at the turn of the twentieth century was a far more important matter to almost
everyone than the commissions earned by livestock traders. Regardless, the Court’s legal
holding in Hopkins was simply not controversial.

D.

U.S. v. Joint Traffic Ass’n
According to the conventional view, U.S. v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505

66
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(1898) entrenched the per se rule against price-fixing even deeper and thus provided a
further stimulus to mergers. But nothing could be further from the truth. For one thing,
nothing in the opinion should have led anyone to believe that it pertained only to pricefixing agreements and not also mergers. Moreover, nothing in the opinion suggested the
Court would interpret the scope of the federal government’s commerce powers more
broadly than in E.C. Knight or Hopkins and therefore extend the reach of the Sherman
Act. In fact, Joint Traffic was perfectly consistent with both E.C. Knight and Hopkins.
That should be no surprise, since it was announced on the same day as Hopkins and both
opinions were written by Justice Peckham. The only plausible reading of Joint Traffic
indicates that, if anything, it actually interpreted the wording of the Sherman Act less
literally and therefore more forgivingly than Trans-Missouri.
The case involved an agreement between thirty-one railroad companies that
operated between Chicago and the Atlantic coast.

Although the preamble to the

agreement stated that its objective was to “aid in fulfilling the purpose of the interstate
commerce act”67 the suit alleged that the association formed by the agreement exercised
control over the members’ rates, fares, and charges in restraint of trade.68 Any member
that deviated from the rates, fares, and charges mandated by the association was liable for
a fine of an amount in proportion to the gross receipts earned by the member in deviating.
The Joint Traffic Ass’n made three arguments in its defense: first of all, that its
agreement was different than the one in Trans-Missouri and that the Trans-Missouri
precedent therefore should not control; second, that the Sherman Act, as construed in
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Trans-Missouri, interfered with the “liberty of the individual” and violated the due
process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S Constitution; and third, that
the holding in Trans-Missouri was “plainly erroneous” and would have “far-reaching and
disastrous” consequences, and should therefore be reconsidered.69
Justice Peckham began by rejecting the argument that Trans-Missouri should not
control the case.

He then moved to the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the

Sherman Act. This was the only novel legal question raised by the case. Peckham
astutely noted, however, that the fact the liberty of contract argument had not been raised
in Trans-Missouri, in spite of the similarities between the two cases was “strong evidence
that the reasons showing the invalidity of the act as construed do not lie on the surface.”70
Nonetheless, Peckham addressed the issue at some length. In response to the claim that,
as construed in Trans-Missouri, the Sherman Act would prohibit contracts as innocuous
as a partnership agreement or a sale, with a noncompetition clause, of the goodwill of a
business, Peckham cited Hopkins: “we have said that the statute applies only to those
contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce….
The effect upon interstate commerce must not be indirect or incidental only…. To
suppose, as is assumed by counsel, that the effect of the decision in the Trans-Missouri
case is to render illegal most business contracts or combinations… is to make a most
violent assumption, and one not called for or justified by the decision mentioned.”71
This is important because it clearly indicates that Justice Peckham believed that
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Hopkins significantly restricted the application of the Sherman Act. According to the
Court’s plain meaning interpretation of the Act, all contracts within its reach and in
restraint of trade illegal were illegal, but the Act reached only those contracts that had a
direct rather than merely an incidental effect on interstate commerce. At the time, the
scope of the Act’s reach was hardly clear, but there was certainly no question, especially
after Trans-Missouri, that it applied to an association of railroad companies engaged in
interstate railroad transportation.

Although the scope of the federal government’s

commerce powers was not really an issue in the case, Peckhams’ dicta nonetheless
suggests that the limits on the federal government’s commerce powers provided a check
against the Court’s otherwise sweeping application of the Act.
Peckhams aside on the scope of the Sherman Act did not, however, address the
main thrust of Joint Traffic’s liberty of contract argument. In rebutting it, Peckham cited
established constitutional doctrine: The power to regulate commerce had no limitation
other than those prescribed in the constitution, but it did not imply the right to destroy or
impair other guarantees which had also been placed in the constitution, or any of the
amendments to it.72 Justice Peckham then noted that there were many kinds of contracts
not protected by the liberty of contracts rights guaranteed under the constitution. The
question, in his view, therefore, was ultimately “whether the statute under review was a
legitimate exercise of the power of congress over interstate commerce”.73 If it was, then
it superceded any liberty of contract rights. Since the Court had already established that
the Sherman Act was a legitimate exercise of federal commerce powers, Peckham thus
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dispensed with the liberty of contracts defense.74 Of course, it is well to keep in mind
that the Court’s holding would have precluded the use of that defense in a suit against any
restraint of trade in interstate commerce, whether the restraint was in the form of a pricefixing agreement or a merger.
Having dispensed with the liberty of contract argument, Justice Peckham then
turned to a reconsideration of the literal interpretation of the Sherman Act in TransMissouri. He noted that it was unusual for the Court to reconsider a question it had
decided so recently, but that the decision had been a close one, with four members
dissenting. He also noted, however, that because the decision had been close, the Court
had carefully reconsidered its holding subsequent to Trans-Missouri Freight’s petition for
a rehearing, and denied the petition.

Peckham observed that Joint Traffic had not

presented any new arguments on the matter, but merely argued that the Court had made
an error. Although it was highly unusual for the Court to reconsider the same arguments
for a third time, it did so because of the “eminence of the counsel engaged, their
earnestness and zeal, their evident belief in the correctness of their position, and… the
very grave nature of the questions argued”.75
As a formal matter, the Court declined to modify its literal interpretation of the
Sherman Act. Justice Peckham’s reasoning, however, is particularly interesting. He
noted that counsel for Joint Traffic was ready to concede that the agreement would have
been in restraint of trade, and therefore illegal, if competition and commerce were
74
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identical – that is, merely alternative words for the same thing.

They contended,

however, that competition and commerce were not identical, and that an agreement such
as the one in the case could restrain competition without restraining commerce. The
Court “entirely” agreed.76 As Peckham explained, “The material considerations therefore
turn upon the effects of competition upon the business of railroads – whether they are
favorable to the commerce in which the railroads are engaged, or unfavorable, and in
restraint of that commerce.”77
Peckham thus acknowledged that the Sherman Act was directed at restraints of
commerce and not restraints of competition. He also acknowledged that the distinction
was meaningful and that a restraint of competition might not be a restraint of commerce.
He then undertook a careful critique of the argument that the association in Joint Traffic
was not a restraint of commerce. According to the association’s counsel, competition
between the railroads was “ruinous” and would only result in the “utter destruction… of
the weaker roads” after which the lone survivor of the competition would raise its rates.78
Peckham argued, however, that “The natural, direct, and immediate effect of competition
is… to lower rates,… and an agreement whose first and direct effect is to prevent this
play of competition restrains, instead of promoting, trade and commerce”.79 He then
noted that whether competition between the railroads would be destructive and a “war to
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the death” was uncertain, and stated the Court’s holding: “An agreement of the nature of
this one, which directly and effectually stifles competition, must be regarded under the
statute as one in restraint of trade, notwithstanding there are possibilities that a restraint
of trade may also follow competition”.80 This was an important rejection of the ruinous
competition argument.
Nonetheless, the Court’s holding in Joint Traffic hardly seems like a per se
prohibition against price-fixing agreements, or, for that matter, a per se prohibition of any
kind at all. For one thing, the wording was qualified: it only made restraints that directly
and immediately lessened competition illegal, and it did not clarify exactly how far the
holding would extend to other cases. In this respect, Peckham’s opinion was consistent
with his opinion in Trans-Missouri, in which he had also used the words “direct” and
“immediate” to characterize the nature of the illegal restraints in that case.81 Moreover,
although the opinion appears to have clearly rejected the argument that a restraint of
competition was not a restraint of commerce on the grounds that competition would be
ruinous or destructive, it seemed to leave the door open to other arguments that restraints
of competition might not be restraints of commerce.

E.

Anderson v. U.S.
As it turned out, on the same day that Justice Peckham delivered the opinions of

the Court in Hopkins and Joint Traffic, he also delivered the Court’s opinion in another
80
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less well-known case: Anderson v. U.S., 171 U.S. 604 (1898). Anderson bore a striking
resemblance to Hopkins, and also arose out of activities at the Kansas City stockyards,
but it was actually decided as a matter of statutory interpretation rather than on
constitutional grounds. In Anderson, the government sued a voluntary unincorporated
association called the Traders’ Livestock Exchange that had been formed for the stated
purpose of “organizing and maintaining a business exchange, not for pecuniary profit or
gain, but to promote and protect all interest connected with the buying and selling of live
stock at the Kansas City stock yards”.82 The government alleged that the real purpose of
the exchange was to prevent nonmembers from buying or selling live stock at the Kansas
City yards and that this “interfered with, hindered, and restrained”83 trade in cattle.
Justice Peckham noted that the government’s allegations were supported by affidavits
from cattle traders who had been prevented from trading in the Kansas yards because
they were not members of the exchange. He also noted, however, that there were other
affidavits testifying that the exchange had improved the integrity of stock trading in the
Kansas yards and had therefore actually increased the volume of trades.
The Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the agreement was
within the reach of the Sherman Act on constitutional grounds because it was not one in
restraint of trade.84 Justice Peckham drew an analogy between a state’s right to take
actions that affected interstate commerce without regulating it (and therefore encroaching
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on the federal government’s commerce powers), and the right of persons engaged in the
same line of business to regulate their conduct without restraining trade. As he put it, “If
an agreement of that nature, while apt and proper for the purpose thus intended, should
possibly, though only indirectly and unintentionally, affect interstate trade or commerce,
…we think the agreement would be good.”85

Justice Peckham distinguished the

agreement among the livestock exchange members from the agreements in other cases
that the courts had found illegal under the Sherman Act on the grounds that the others all
involved price-fixing (it is interesting, however, that Justice Peckham did not list either
Trans-Missouri or Joint Traffic among these price-fixing cases).86 In contrast, he noted
“This association does not meddle with prices…” and “has no direct tendency to
diminish, or in any way, impede or restrain, interstate commerce”.87
Anderson illustrated that the Court’s limitation of the Sherman Act to direct
restraints of trade in interstate commerce was substantive. It corroborated the distinction
the Court had drawn in Joint Traffic between restraints of competition and restraints of
interstate commerce.

Justice Peckham’s dicta seemed to imply that price-fixing

agreements were always direct restraints of trade and therefore illegal per se, but the
opinion did not otherwise help to distinguish where the Court would draw the line
between direct and indirect restraints. Anderson also suggests, however, that the Court
did not regard either Trans-Missouri or Joint Traffic as simply price-fixing cases since
Peckham did not include them among the examples of price-fixing cases he cited in the
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opinion. In fact, Peckham did not use the terms “price-fixing” or “cartel” in either of
those opinions. More importantly, there was nothing in Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, or
Anderson to suggest that mergers would not also be considered direct restraints of trade,
or that the Sherman Act would apply less ruthlessly to mergers than to any other direct
restraints of trade.
In the wake of Joint Traffic, therefore, the Supreme Court had interpreted the
Sherman Act to mean that all direct restraints of trade that directly affected interstate
commerce were illegal.

This would have excluded contracts, combinations, and

conspiracies in direct restraint of trade that extended only to manufacturing activities or
local (not interstate) commerce, as the Court had held in E.C. Knight and Hopkins, but it
would have included any contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that directly
restrained trade and directly affected interstate commerce. Dicta in Anderson implied
that all price-fixing agreements would be construed as direct restraints on trade, but it
also implied that neither Trans-Missouri nor Joint Traffic had been construed as simply
price-fixing cases.

Nonetheless, the Court had clearly held that the association

agreements at question in each of those cases directly restrained trade. The cumulative
effect of all the Supreme Court cases from E.C. Knight through Joint Traffic was to
establish that any price-fixing agreements, or association agreements like the ones in
Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic, or any other direct restraints of trade would be illegal if
they directly affected interstate commerce.

F.

Railroad Consolidations after Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic
By the time Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic were announced, the Great Merger
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Movement was well under way. Bittlingmayer contends that “[a]lthough some railroad
consolidations had been undertaken in the mid-1890’s, their number increased sharply
after the Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic decisions.”88

He observes that this was

consistent with the view that the Supreme Court drove the railroads (and presumably
others) away from looser forms of cooperation, such as the association agreements in
Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic, and toward tighter forms of cooperation, such as
mergers. It is certainly true that there was a correlation between the timing of these
decisions and the crest of the merger movement, but that hardly justifies the assumption
that the Court’s holdings in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic caused an upswing in
railroad mergers. As the foregoing analysis of the cases indicates, there was nothing in
the holdings themselves that should have caused anyone to think that a merger between
competing railroads was less likely to be illegal under the Sherman Act than the
association agreements.
Trans-Missouri clearly established that railroads engaged in interstate
transportation were within the reach of the Sherman Act. Joint Traffic established that
any direct restraint of trade that directly affected interstate commerce was illegal. The
Court had not, at that point, addressed the question of whether a merger between
competing railroads would have directly restrained trade, but the rather broad application
of the plain meaning doctrine in those cases clearly should have made any reasonable
person wonder whether a merger would have been much safer than an association
agreement.89 Whether it did or not, what is most noticeably lacking from the record is a
88

89

Bittlingmayer, supra note 4 at 136.
There was still considerable uncertainty about the legality of mergers, especially when organized

39

smoking gun. There is not a single citation in the historical literature to any newspaper
editorial or journal article or other contemporaneous source that suggests the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic caused the steep rise in merger
activity around the turn of the twentieth century.90 In light of all the attention that was
focused on the “trust problem” at the time, this raises serious questions about the
conventional law and economics view.

G.

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899) was decided a year after

through a holding company. Some argued, perhaps wishfully, that holding companies would be immune
from antitrust prosecution on liberty of contract grounds (see Railway Concentration, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1899, at 6), but others recognized that Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic made the legality of most railroad
mergers doubtful (see The Joint Traffic Decision. Solicitor General Richards’ View of the Probable Effect
Upon the Railroads and Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, October 29, 1898, at 9).
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References to statements by attorneys that suggested the Supreme Court’s decisions caused the mergers

have always been somewhat vague and usually seem to refer to statements made some time after the
merger movement ended. See Freyer, supra note 15. The author has spent many hours researching
primary and secondary sources and has never found a single contemporaneous newspaper editorial or
journal article that directly attributed the merger movement to Trans-Missouri or Joint Traffic. On the
other hand, newspaper and journal articles that suggested other causes were quite common, even at the
peak of the merger wave. For instance, a New York Times article at the height of the Great Merger
Movement reported on Jeremiah Jenks’ investigation of the trust problem in Europe for his report to the
Industrial Commission (see Trust Problem In Europe, N.Y. TIMES, September 23, 1900, at 24). After
several months study, Jenks concluded that the trust situation in Europe was “about the same as in this
country,” and that “industrial consolidation in Europe has been forced by the same causes, …namely severe
competition and small profits”.
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Joint Traffic. The case arose when the government sought an injunction against six
companies that manufactured, sold, and transported iron pipe from their factories on the
grounds that they had formed an association for the purpose of restraining competition in
all of the thirty-six states in which they did business. The companies admitted that they
had formed the association to restrain competition, but argued that the agreement was
necessary to avoid succumbing to ruinous competition. They asserted in their defense a
liberty of contract claim similar to the one in Joint Traffic, and a commerce clause claim
based on E.C. Knight. The Court rejected both arguments and upheld the injunction.
Justice Peckham once again wrote the majority opinion. He began by rejecting
the defendants’ liberty of contract argument in sweeping terms.

He noted that the

Constitution clearly assigned the power to regulate interstate commerce to Congress.
That power included the right to enact any legislation necessary to prohibit contracts or
combinations that directly restrained trade and had a direct affect on interstate
commerce.91 He thus limited citizens’ liberty of contract rights to those that did not
conflict with the federal government’s commerce powers. As he explained, “the power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce comprises the right to enact a law
prohibiting the citizen from entering into those private contracts which directly and
substantially… regulate… commerce among the states”.92 One would think that, in
conjunction with the Court’s rejection of the liberty of contract argument in Joint Traffic,
this should have dispensed with it once and for all, although that turned out not to be the
case.
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Justice Peckham then turned to the defendants’ commerce clause challenge. In
accordance with the doctrine enunciated for the Court by Justice Fuller in E.C. Knight,
this boiled down to whether the agreement between the pipe manufacturers was a direct
restraint of interstate commerce. At this point, Justice Peckham deferred entirely to the
opinion written by Judge Taft for the circuit court of appeals and actually quoted Judge
Taft’s opinion at great length.93 Judge Taft was careful to distinguish E.C. Knight: “the
direct purpose of the combination in… Knight… was the control of …manufacture….
There was no… agreement… regarding the future disposition of the manufactured
article”.94 Although contracts involving only the manufacture of products were beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act, “contracts for the sale and transportation to other states of
specific articles were proper subjects for regulation”.95 In Judge Taft’s view, and, by
implication, Justice Peckham’s, the case in Addyston Pipe involved an agreement that
extended not just to the manufacture of iron pipe, but also to its sale and transportation
across state lines. The Court, by adopting Judge Taft’s opinion as its own, thus clarified,
if there had ever really been any doubt, that E.C. Knight placed agreements involving
only manufacturing activities beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, but not all
93

Judge Taft would later become the twenty-seventh President of the United States, and, subsequently to

that, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Ironically, his opinion in Addyston Pipe is probably as
famous as any opinions he later wrote while he served on the Supreme Court.

While it probably

confounded the common law, it was nonetheless one of the most clearly reasoned and articulated antitrust
opinions in the years immediately after the passage of the Sherman Act (see LETWIN, supra note 34 at
172-178 for a detailed analysis).
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agreements involving manufacturers.

H.

Consolidations After Addyston Pipe
Bittlingmayer observes that Addyston Pipe was followed by another upsurge in

merger activity. Since the Supreme Court had already rejected the liberty of contract
defense in Joint Traffic, the only plausible way that the ruling in Addyston Pipe could
have actually caused the upsurge in mergers was by signaling that the Court would
subsequently read E.C. Knight more narrowly and interpret the reach of the Sherman Act
more broadly, and even then only under the assumption that Addyston Pipe would apply
to looser combinations, but not also to mergers. In light of Justice Fuller’s dicta in E.C.
Knight that suggested the government lost merely by failing to prove that the agreement
extended beyond manufacturing, any argument that Addyston Pipe signaled the Court
would begin to interpret the scope of the Sherman Act more broadly seems dubious.
Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in Justice Peckham’s Addyston Pipe opinion that
should have suggested it would apply only to looser combinations and not also mergers.
Once gain, however, what is most striking is that there is not a single citation in the
literature to any contemporaneous source that suggests the Supreme Court’s decision in
Addyston Pipe caused an upsurge in merger activity.96

I.

Northern Securities Co. v. U.S.
The next important development in the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence
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was not until Northern Securities in 1904.97 Northern Securities was a hotly debated case
that the government planned very carefully under the direction of Roosevelt’s Attorney
General, Philander Knox.98 Knox anticipated a prolonged legal battle and so he invoked
the newly enacted Expediting Act to certify the case to the circuit court of appeals
directly and skip trial at the district court level. The case involved two competing
railroad companies, the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern, whose major
stockholders had agreed to merge their interests by creating the Northern Securities Co.
and transferring their stock to its control. Northern Securities thus came to hold 96
percent of Northern Pacific’s stock and 76 percent of Great Northern’s stock.99
Since this was the first case to involve a merger between competing firms
engaged in interstate commerce, one might have imagined that it would present difficult
new legal questions, and so it is interesting to observe that the circuit court of appeals
reached a decision easily and unanimously, holding that the Northern Securities Co. had
violated the Sherman Act.

It is especially interesting to note that the form of the

combination, a merger of corporate interests through a holding company, rather than an
arms-length agreement between distinct legal entities, posed no particular problem for the
court. As the court explained, “the law… looks always at the substance of things…
97

In the meantime, the Court had decided W.W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904), but

Montague merely affirmed the Court’s holding in Addyston Pipe that an agreement between manufacturers
that affected the sale of an item (in this case, tiles) between the states was within the reach of the Sherman
Act. It was not a significant case.
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rather than upon the particular devices or means by which it is accomplished.”100 This
corroborates the point that nothing in the Supreme Court’s previous antitrust decisions
had done anything to suggest that mergers would be exempt from the Sherman Act’s
reach.
Nonetheless, the case did raise some important new questions and so the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for a plurality of the
Justices, although the Court was sharply divided, and the case is probably more famous
for Justice Holmes’ dissenting opinion than for Justice Harlan’s. Harlan began by stating
all the relevant legal principles that the Court had clearly established in its prior Sherman
Act cases.101 His summary left no doubt that, absent any new legal objections, the prior
cases had clearly made all direct restraints of trade in interstate commerce illegal,
whether they involved an arms-length agreement, such as a price-fixing case, or an
outright merger.102

As he emphasized, “No one, we assume, will deny that these

propositions were distinctly announced in the former decisions of this court”.103 Since
railroad carriers were clearly engaged in interstate commerce, Northern Securities clearly
fell within the scope of those decisions unless “the special objections… of the present
case” exempted it.104
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The first “special objection” addressed by the Court was Northern Securities’
argument that it was a state corporation regulated under state law and that it should
therefore have been outside the scope of the federal government’s commerce powers.
Since the scope of the Sherman Act was limited by the federal government’s commerce
powers, Northern Securities should have been beyond its reach. Justice Harlan dispensed
with this argument summarily. As he explained, there was no reason to believe the
Sherman Act interfered with the states’ powers since, by its own terms, it regulated only
interstate commerce or commerce with foreign nations and these were clearly within the
scope of federal commerce powers.
The second “special objection” addressed by the Court was more difficult.
Northern Securities argued that the constitutional guarantee of the liberty of contract
prohibited Congress from interfering with individuals’ rights to transfer their stock,
which was their own private property, to a private corporation. Enforcing the Sherman
Act to void the transaction would therefore constitute an unconstitutional interference
with the freedom of all citizens to dispose of their personal property in the manner of
their choosing. As Justice Harlan observed, however, Northern Securities was trying to
rephrase the question in the case to ask “whether Northern Securities Company can
acquire and hold stock in other state corporations,”105 when the government’s contention
was merely that it had the constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce and
that the Northern Securities Company had illegally restrained interstate commerce.106
Justice Harlan’s response to this second objection was resolute: Congress has
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Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
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the authority to exercise all its powers and rights to regulate interstate commerce in any
manner it chooses.107 The fact that the Northern Securities Company was created under a
state law was irrelevant. In fact, as Justice Harlan noted, when Congress passed the
Sherman Act it merely sought to regulate interstate commerce in a manner similar to
which the states had commonly regulated their intra-state commerce for many years. To
that end, he cited numerous cases in which state courts had held business combinations,
including holding companies such as the one in Northern Securities, to be illegal under
state laws.108

“If a state may strike down combinations that restrain its domestic

commerce” he asked, “what power, except that of Congress, is competent to protect…
interstate… commerce?”.109 He observed that if Northern Securities was to prevail with
this argument there would be nothing to prevent all the railroads in the nation from
merging into a single holding company.
Finally, the defendants argued that the regulation of their transaction by the
federal government would violate the 10th Amendment’s reservation of powers not
granted to the United States to the states or the people. Justice Harlan’s response was
almost contemptuous: “We cannot conceive how it is possible for anyone to seriously
contend for such a proposition. It means nothing less than that Congress… must act in
subordination to the will of the states when exerting their power to create
corporations”.110
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Id. at 342.
Id. at 345.

As he bluntly asserted, “No such view can be entertained for a
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moment.”111 Rather, the Court was free to issue any order necessary to dissolve or
suppress an illegal combination, and could do so without infringing any state rights. As
to the argument that the Northern Securities Company’s stock purchases had merely been
an investment that was legal under its state charter and therefore could not be made
illegal under federal law, Justice Harlan was equally contemptuous: “This view is wholly
fallacious, …and does not comport with the actual transaction… [A]ll the stock held or
acquired in the constituent companies was acquired and held to be used in suppressing
competition”.112
Justice Harlan wrote, however, only for a plurality of the Court, which
included, in addition to himself, Justices Brown, McKenna, and Day. They were joined
by Justice Brewer in a separate concurring opinion. Although Justice Brewer concurred
with the plurality’s holding, he did not concur with its reasoning, and it therefore turned
out that Brewer’s opinion played a pivotal role in defining where American antitrust law
stood at the start of the twentieth century. Justice Brewer began by reversing his own
position on the rule of reason in Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Addyston Pipe. As he
now viewed matters, the rulings in those cases should not have been that the contracts
were illegal merely because they were direct restraints of trade, but rather, that they were
illegal because they were unreasonable, direct restraints of trade. The purpose of the
Sherman Act had not been to make restraints of trade that had been deemed reasonable
under the common law illegal, but to prohibit only those contracts or combinations that
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“…were in direct restraint of trade, unreasonable, and against public policy”.113
Although he reversed himself on the application of the plain meaning doctrine
and adopted a rule of reason standard, Justice Brewer nonetheless concluded that the
Northern Securities Company was in violation of the Sherman Act. Although Congress
did not have the power to limit the rights of an individual citizen to make whatever stock
purchases he pleased, the Northern Securities Company was an organization of many
private individuals and hence merely an “…artificial person, created …only for the
convenient transaction of business”.114 If an artificial person, such as the Northern
Securities Company, was to have the unfettered right to purchase stock, it could easily
come to control the nation’s entire railway system. In his view, such an outcome could
not be “…a reasonable or lawful restraint of trade”.115 More to the point, perhaps, the
Northern Securities Company unreasonably restrained inter-state trade and was therefore
illegal under the Sherman Act.
The nature of Justice Brewer’s concurrence and the rationale for his opinion
were much more significant for antitrust jurisprudence than some scholars have seemed
to acknowledge. Justice Brewer’s separate concurrence, and his adoption of a rule of
reason, meant that only four of the Justices stood ready to hold that all mergers that
directly restrained interstate commerce were illegal per se under the Sherman Act. It
meant that, in effect, mergers would be adjudicated under a rule of reason. It may also
have cast some doubt on whether arms-length restraints, such as the ones in Trans-
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Missouri or Joint Traffic would still be adjudicated under a per se rule.116 Justice Brewer
clearly understood that this was the consequence of his separate concurring opinion.
Indeed, it appears that this was a consequence he intended to effect. He was apparently
concerned that a blanket prohibition on mergers might have an unsettling effect on the
business sector. As he explained, he “felt constrained to make these observations for fear
that the broad and sweeping language of the opinion of the court might tend to unsettle
legitimate business enterprises, stifle …wholesome business activities, …and invite
unnecessary litigation.”117
Justice Brewer’s logic, and the pivotal importance of his separate concurrence,
were clearly understood by sophisticated observers.

In an article the day after the

Northern Securities decision was announced, the New York Times, which had
consistently railed against the sweeping literal interpretation of the Sherman Act that the
Supreme Court had handed down in Trans-Missouri, reported that stocks had risen
sharply after the decision was announced, and attributed the effect to Justice Brewer’s

116
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dissenters …his concurrence meant that Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Addyston Pipe were, in effect,
reopened.” FISS, supra note 42 at 141. This seems dubious. Justice White had rendered the only
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concurrence. As the article118 noted, Brewer “abstained from the extremes indulged by
both the majority and minority, and took his stand by himself.” This was significant,
because “No reasonable restraints of trade can be punished without his vote, and his vote
cannot be had….

Justice Brewer’s opinion frees us from capricious and partial

enforcement of an indefensible statute for political reasons”.
Indeed, according to the Times, Wall Street was pleasantly surprised by the
outcome of the case.

In an article119 published two days after the decision was

announced, the Times observed that the decision had relieved some of the uncertainties
that plagued the large class of trusts that could ostensibly meet a rule of reason test. As
the writers noted, Wall Street had never been particularly concerned with Northern
Securities’ fate. But the decision in the case offered reasonable combinations “a long
respite if not permanent relief…” from the fear of a capricious prosecution that had hung
over them ever since the Supreme Court applied a plain meaning interpretation to the
Sherman Act in Trans-Missouri. Brewer’s concurring opinion offered “a golden bridge
over which the court could pass to a more lenient interpretation of the statute, while
preserving its consistency and standing upon its precedents”. In that regard, the Times
saw the Northern Securities decision as “a reversal of the court’s previous position.” Its
importance was in the consequence that, “the sheep and goats among the trusts are to be
separated”.
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The Northern Securities decision thus marked a significant departure from the
Supreme Court’s prior antitrust jurisprudence.120 By the time the circuit court of appeals’
decision was announced, most observers probably believed that the Supreme Court would
affirm it and that a literal reading of the Sherman Act would be extended to all mergers
within the scope of the federal commerce powers.121 Indeed, this fear was the cloud
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than some scholars have recognized. LETWIN, supra note 34 at 227, for instance, summarized Northern
Securities as establishing the rule that “…‘direct restraint of trade’ meant any direct interference with
competition.”

SKLAR, supra note 36, completely missed the legal effect of Brewer’s separate

concurrence and characterized Northern Securities as extending the jurisprudence of Trans-Missouri and
Joint Traffic to mergers.
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hanging over the trusts to which the New York Times article cited in the previous
paragraph referred. Ironically, therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision was actually
welcomed by many in the business community. Even though it clarified that the reach of
the Sherman Act extended to mergers conducted through the formation of holding
companies, Justice Brewer’s concurrence in effect meant that it would be applied
according to a rule of reason standard rather than a per se prohibition. This was good
news for the captains of American industry, not bad, and it may explain why the New
York Stock Exchange jumped rather than dropped when the decision was announced.
The ‘good news’ was augmented by public pronouncements from the
Roosevelt administration that it did not intend to begin an onslaught of new prosecutions.
Indeed, in a New York Times article122 titled, “Government Will Not Run Amuck,” the
day after the Northern Securities decision was announced, Attorney General Knox
attempted to allay the fears of investors and industrialists by emphasizing that the
government’s enforcement actions would remain cautious. The Times123 attributed the
unexpectedly favorable response of investors to the Northern Securities decision in part
to Knox’s assurances, which were widely taken to “…mean there would be no further
prosecutions by the government.”
In sum, the evidence clearly contradicts any suggestion that the Supreme
met the approval, with very few exceptions, of those best qualified to pass judgment upon it….” Id. at 578. He claimed to stake his entire professional reputation on his view of the case, asserting that “…in the
view of the general professional and lay mind as well, the case must have been decided, by an honest and
intelligent court, as it was decided”. Id. at 65.
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Court’s decision in Northern Securities should have struck fear into the hearts of
American industrialists and put an immediate end to the Great Merger Movement. Yet
this is exactly what the conventional law and economics view would have us believe.
Given the legal effect of the Northern Securities decision, and the overwhelming
evidence about how it was received, if merger decisions at the turn of the twentieth
century had been nearly as sensitive to developments in antitrust law as the conventional
law and economics view assumes, Northern Securities should have accelerated the rate of
merger activity. The fact that merger activities declined suggests that the mergers were
driven primarily by other forces, and were not nearly as sensitive to the Supreme Court’s
antitrust decisions as the conventional wisdom assumes.
It is important to remember that the reason many law and economics scholars
argue that E.C. Knight placed most mergers beyond the reach of the Sherman Act had
nothing to do with the nature of the consolidation in that case, but rather, with the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the federal government’s commerce powers.
There is nothing in Harlan’s Northern Securities opinion to suggest that the Court had
modified the distinction it laid down in E.C. Knight between manufacturing and
commerce, or that it had revised where the line would be drawn. It had long been
established that railroads were instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and the
companies involved in the Northern Securities case were competitors in inter-state
transportation. The case simply did not test the scope of the federal government’s
commerce powers. Nonetheless, when the Northern Securities decision was handed
down, most contemporary observers seemed to believe that mergers between
manufacturing firms that were also engaged in inter-state commerce would lie within the
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reach of the Sherman Act.124
This further corroborates the argument that E.C. Knight had never carved out as
large an exception to the reach of the federal commerce powers as some scholars have led
us to believe. Its legal effect was not to place all mergers beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act. This may not have been understood by all contemporary observers at the
time, but it was clearly understood by many. Although the manufacturing/commerce
distinction did not loom as an important impediment to the reach of the Sherman Act
after Northern Securities, or even as a particularly significant legal issue, the scope of the
federal commerce powers and the full reach of the Sherman Act remained unclear.

J.

Swift & Co. v. United States
Any lingering questions about the scope of the federal commerce powers and the

reach of the Sherman Act were resolved in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375
(1905). Swift involved a suit under the Sherman Act against a combination of meat
packing companies for conspiring to restrain competition and monopolize interstate trade
in dressed meats.

The defendants were involved in buying livestock at markets in

Chicago, Omaha, St. Joseph, Kansas City, East St. Louis, and St. Paul. They would
slaughter the livestock and ship it elsewhere, often across state lines. Among other
things, the government alleged that the meat packers prevented their agents from bidding
against one another in buying livestock and fixed the prices of their meats to their dealers.
124
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Justice Holmes wrote the opinion for the Court, which was unanimous. The case
bore a close resemblance to Hopkins, in which the Court held that the local business of
the commission stockyard traders was not interstate commerce and was therefore beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act, and so Holmes carefully addressed the commerce powers
issue in his opinion. Holmes began by distinguishing the case from E.C. Knight. He
observed that the subject matter of E.C. Knight was a combination of manufacture, and
that “However likely monopoly of commerce was to follow from the agreement it was
not a necessary consequence nor a primary end”.125 This seemed to imply that if the
primary purpose of a merger in manufacture was to effect monopoly in interstate
commerce it would be within the scope of the federal commerce powers.

It also

corroborates Letwin’s suggestion that if the government had prosecuted E.C. Knight
differently it might have been able to construe the case as one involving interstate
commerce.126 Holmes distinguished Swift from E.C. Knight on the grounds that the
subject matter in Swift was sales, and the “...very point of the combination was to restrain
and monopolize commerce among the states”.127
Holmes then addressed the much finer distinction between Swift and Hopkins. He
noted that the defendants in Hopkins were themselves neither buyers nor sellers on the
livestock exchange. They merely furnished certain facilities for the sales. Thus, “the
effects of the combination of brokers upon the commerce was only indirect, and not
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within the [Sherman] Act.”128 Holmes noted that in Swift the defendants were charged
with restricting competition between their agents when purchasing livestock in the
stockyards. The purchasers, the slaughtering facilities, and the sellers of the livestock
were usually located in different states. Thus, the “…intent of the combination was not
merely to restrict competition among the parties, but …to aid in an attempt to monopolize
commerce among the states”.129 With that, Holmes adopted the current of commerce
doctrine:
Commerce among the states is not a technical, legal
conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of
business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one
state, with the expectation that they will end their transit,
after purchase, in another, and when, in effect they do so,
with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at
the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly
recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of
commerce among the states, and the purchase of the cattle
is a part and incident of such commerce.130
It seems clear that the current of commerce doctrine, as Homes stated it, could
easily have been used to affirm the government’s prosecution of the livestock brokers in
Hopkins. Ironically, the term “stream of commerce” had first been used by District Judge
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Cassius Foster in upholding the government’s prosecution of the livestock brokers in that
same case, and on appeal, the Supreme Court had rejected the doctrine unanimously.131
Regardless, if there were any lingering doubts about the reach of the Sherman Act to
mergers of manufacturers that were engaged in inter-state sales, Swift cleared the air. In
fact, it probably also brought within the reach of the Act many activities might previously
have been beyond its grasp, such as those in Hopkins.
Swift is widely regarded as one of the most important commerce clause decisions
ever handed down by the Supreme Court.132 Yet it has been virtually ignored by antitrust
scholars, and particularly by the critics of antitrust who have argued (or accepted as a
matter of faith) that the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions caused the Great
Merger Movement. Proponents of the theory have assumed that Northern Securities
brought mergers of manufacturers within the reach of the Sherman Act and have pointed
to the drop off in merger activity after Northern Securities as evidence in support their
views. But Northern Securities was a railroad case, and did nothing to extend the scope
of federal commerce powers. If E.C. Knight had in fact carved such a large safe harbor
around mergers of manufacturers, it was Swift that should have precipitated the decline in
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merger activity, not Northern Securities.
Well-informed people at the time knew that Swift was an important case. Shortly
after the decision was announced, the Outlook133 observed that Swift marked “…an
important step in our elaboration of a system of Federal control over commerce”. In an
article134 written for the New York Times, Edward A. Bradford wrote: “The significance
of the decision is that it condemns …an entire series of acts taken together…. Under the
modern principles of ‘integrating’ industries …there is scarcely one which is wholly
limited to the boundaries of a single State, and which is not therefore inter-State and
subject to the principles declared in the Beef Trust case”. In a review135 of the important
developments in law affecting big business during 1905, Athelstan Vaughan noted that
Swift was “the United States Supreme Court case which attracted the most public
attention” and that after Swift “…it does not matter that …a combination primarily
embraces monopoly …in but a single State if …also directed against commerce among
the States”.
In spite of its importance, both for the reach of the Sherman Act and the scope of
federal commerce powers, the reaction to Swift was muted. The stock market remained,
in the words of the New York Times, “feverishly strong”.136 The case itself received little
attention in the law reviews, and was not the subject of a single law review article in any
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of the succeeding years.137 Indeed, the decision in the case seems to have been expected.
Perhaps intelligent observers knew that a narrow interpretation of the federal commerce
powers could not stand in the face of the pressures and challenges of a modern industrial
economy. Or perhaps, as Edward A. Bradford suggested in his New York Times article138
shortly after the decision was announced, business leaders took “courage from the fact
that threatened trusts live long, and ignore litigation where the death rate is so small.”

K.

Summary
It is evident from the record that the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions

simply could not have had the dramatic consequences for the organization of American
business that the conventional law and economics theory implies. E.C. Knight did not
limit the reach of the Sherman Act nearly as much as many scholars have imagined. To
the extent that it did limit the reach of the Sherman Act, its limits applied as much to
arms-length restraints as to combinations that achieved mergers of separate business
interests. Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic certainly implied that a literal interpretation
of the Act would apply to any contracts or combinations within the Act’s reach, but they
also implied that mergers would be subjected to the same literal interpretation of the Act
that price-fixing and other arms-length agreements would be subjected to. Business
leaders may have doubted whether many mergers would be within the reach of the
Sherman Act. But by the time the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Securities was
announced, most observers seemed to expect that mergers of railroads would be within
137

138

Gordon, supra note 131 at 278.
N.Y. TIMES, supra note 134.

60

the Act’s reach.
Ironically, many business leaders welcomed the Northern Securities decision
because it meant that a rule of reason rather than a per se prohibition would be applied to
any mergers within the Sherman Act‘s reach. Nonetheless, Northern Securities was still
a railroad case and it did nothing to extend the reach of the Sherman Act beyond the
limits imposed in E.C. Knight. The scope of federal commerce powers was not extended
until Swift. Yet there was a significant decline in merger activity well before Swift was
decided. Moreover, the business community’s response to Swift was muted. Business
leaders had either always believed that mergers of manufacturers were within the reach of
the Sherman Act, or they had come to expect that mergers of manufacturers would be
brought within the reach of the Act, or they simply did not care because the threat of
prosecution was still so remote.
It is clear from a careful reading of the Supreme Court cases and the responses to
them that the consolidation movement at the turn of the twentieth century was driven
primarily by other forces.

Indeed, the merger movement was essentially a global

phenomenon, and certainly not restricted to the United States. Nations such as Germany
and Great Britain that had no statutory antitrust laws and were not similarly focused on
antitrust prosecutions also experienced significant waves of merger activity during the
same years.139 The question that therefore remains to be answered is what were those
139
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other primary driving forces, and how did they interact with developments in the
Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence? Perhaps most important of all, what permanent
stamp did they leave on the American system of business regulation in its formative
stage?

IV. ANTITRUST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
AMERICAN BUSINESS REGULATION
The “trust problem” began well before the turn of the century -- indeed, the
Sherman Act was primarily a response to public fears about the growing number of
business combinations and consolidations.140 Many contemporary observers believed that
the trend toward consolidation was an inevitable and natural consequence of the
contemporary business conditions.141 Indeed, there was undoubtedly a great deal of truth
to this conviction. The U.S. economy was altered in fundamental ways by ongoing
developments in transportation and communications technologies that began in the
British Manufacturing Industry, 26 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1 (1974), and Alfred D. Chandler, SCALE
AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 423-7 (1990).
140
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middle of the nineteenth century.142

With transportation costs so much lower, the

potential size of the markets for many types of products increased dramatically. Business
firms in industries that produced these products were able to avail themselves of massproduction technologies that would previously have been unprofitable. Indeed, many of
the famous titans of American industry from this period achieved their fame and fortune
by developing and refining the mass-production technologies necessary to take advantage
of the new opportunities.143
The period from about 1870-1920 was therefore one which featured an
unprecedented rate of technological advancement. Indeed, it was during this period that
the foundations of the modern economy were laid.

Electric power generation and

utilization, the internal combustion engine, the modern skyscraper, and numerous other
technological innovations were all developed around the turn of the twentieth century.144
Almost every industry and facet of life was transformed in some way by important
technological breakthroughs. Manufacturing plants were redesigned and retooled, labor
was replaced by capital, and the new machines were harnessed to important new sources
of industrial power. The companies that were the first to develop or take advantage of
the new technologies tended to achieve a distinct edge over their competitors, especially
142
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if they proved to be proficient at maintaining their technological lead through subsequent
refinements of the technologies. The companies that fell behind in the race to adopt the
new technologies were left in the dust and often faced dissolution or bankruptcy.
Companies competed, therefore, not only through their prices, but also by
attempting to innovate faster and more effectively than their competitors and thus
produce a better product at lower costs.

But to implement important technological

innovations the companies usually had to make significant investments in new capital.
They had to build new plants and fit them with the latest equipment and machinery, or
they had to completely redesign and retool their existing plants so that they could convert
them from the use of steam or water power to electricity.145 This required considerable
amounts of financial capital. And the investments were often risky, especially if the
company was engaged in fierce competition with its rivals.
These business conditions often made competition problematic well before the
Sherman Act was enacted.

In their rush to succeed, competing firms often made

simultaneous capital investments that in the face of the rising productivity and the limits
on consumer demand could not possibly provide a reasonable rate of return. Overinvestment and excess capacity was therefore a common problem.146 The problem was
145
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exacerbated by the size of the stakes. Big business was new, and so were investments on
the scale required for modern, new plants equipped with relatively sophisticated machine
tools and driven by electric power. The potential rewards to companies that could
innovate successfully and entrench themselves as the industry leader were huge. But the
risks were equally great. Companies that lost in the competitive struggle might face
financial collapse and not only lose tens of millions of dollars in investments (a huge sum
for the time), but have to lay off thousands of employees as well.147
The pressures on firms to escape from the competition and alleviate some of the
uncertainties arose in many industries well before the Sherman Act was passed. 148 Their
efforts to restrain competition tended to begin with looser, arms-length forms of
cooperation, such as price-fixing agreements or cartels.

These commonly failed,

however, and were usually succeeded by tighter forms of control, often ending in a
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consolidation of the competitors’ legal interests through some form of merger.
By happenstance, Louis Brandeis delivered a series of lectures at MIT in the early
years of the twentieth century on the topic of the trusts.149 His lectures provide an
important insight into the prevailing views about the merger movement among educated
people at the time.

Brandeis distinguished four types of trusts:150 1) the cartel: an

agreement among manufacturers not to sell their products below certain prices; 2) the
trade association: an agreement establishing a central body charged with regulating
prices; 3) the trust: a device by which the owners of competing firms transferred their
stock to a group of trustees, who would then manage their businesses cooperatively; and
4) the merger: a consolidation of the firms into a single entity, often through the
formation of a holding company.
Brandeis observed that attempts to restrain competition usually began with cartel
agreements or trade associations.151 These looser forms of cooperation usually failed,
however, when economic hardship or self-interest caused members to deviate from the
agreements. When firms were able to rally together again after these breakdowns in their
agreements they usually attempted a tighter form of cooperation, such as a trust or a
merger.152 The trust device eventually ran afoul of the law, however, and so, in the end,
mergers were the only real alternative to ineffectual cartel or trade association
agreements. Brandeis thus concluded that “the legal limitation on loose combinations
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promoted tighter combinations”,153 but the legal limitations he was referring to had
nothing to do with Trans-Missouri or Joint Traffic. In fact, Brandeis was referring to the
challenges to the trust device under state corporation laws. These were first made in New
York by the state government before the Sherman act was even enacted. 154
Brandeis’ observations have been corroborated by other contemporaneous
accounts as well as more systematic historical studies.

Alfred Chandler, the most

important business historian of the twentieth century, has noted that the pressures to
escape from competition were “particularly strong in the new capital- and energyintensive industries where several entrepreneurs had simultaneously adopted innovative
technologies of production”.155

According to the Twelfth Census of Manufactures,

technological competition among firms at the turn of the century was so severe that it
caused capital investments to become technological obsolescent at an extraordinary
rate.156 Prominent business leaders commonly attested to this as well, although often for
153
154
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the purpose of justifying their attempts to restrain competition.
John Searles, for example, the first Secretary Treasurer of the American Sugar
Refining Company, wrote that “Sugar refining became a thing of mysteries, each refiner
seeking to discover for himself the method of treatment which would enable him to
improve upon that of his competitor. These changes of methods involved the practical
remodeling of the older refineries, and so great was the advantage of the more modern
houses that the older and weaker ones were driven to the wall…. [The competition was
so fierce], it became a question of the survival of the fittest”.157 Elbert Gary, Chairman of
U.S. Steel, described conditions in the steel industry in similar terms: “There was a
competition that was bitter, fierce, [and[ destructive.

If it did not absolutely drive

competitors out of business, it so harassed and injured them as to prevent them from
extending their business …and at times compelled them to close their mills [and]
discharge their employees”.158 Gary’s business rival, Andrew Carnegie, described the
steel industry in almost exactly the same terms.159
Indeed, many prominent academics at the time, including many leading young
economists, adhered to the theory of “ruinous competition” and viewed cartels, trade
associations, and other forms of combination as a reasonable and practical response. In a
study of the salt cartel, for instance, Jeremiah Jenks concluded that it was motivated not
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to charge monopoly prices, but to prevent ruinous competition.160 Paul Vogt reached
similar conclusions in a study of the sugar trust, and so did Charles Edgerton in a study of
the wire nail association.161 Indeed, the prevalent view among economists around the turn
of the twentieth century was that competition was often problematic, and that
combinations and other restraints of trade were often socially beneficial.162
The theory of ruinous competition was, in fact, invoked by some state courts to
enforce certain price-fixing agreements.163 Some courts cited the theory in upholding
mergers as well.164 The Supreme Court itself relied on the ruinous competition rationale
to protect a private waterworks company from competition in Walla Walla,165 although
this was not an antitrust case and did not involve the Sherman Act.

Some of the

defendants in early Sherman Act cases did raise the theory in their defense, but the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the defense in Trans-Missouri. The argument came up
again in both Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe and was again rejected in both cases.166
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Nonetheless, the theory continued to have strong proponents long after the turn of the
century, and figured prominently in contemporaneous explanations about the causes of
the “trust problem”.167 Although some observers may also have felt that the Supreme
Court’s Sherman Act cases had an important tilting effect on the trend toward
consolidation, this was not the prevalent view about the underlying causes of the trust
problem around the turn of the twentieth century.
Regardless of the underlying causes, many consolidations came to wield
significant economic and political power.168 Even when mergers were compelled in large
part by the prospects of ongoing, ruinous competition they still often had significant
anticompetitive effects. There is no question that they generated significant public alarm.
Indeed, the Sherman Act is probably best understood as a highly compromised response
to the political crisis that the trust movement created for federal politicians. Federal
politicians were compelled to show the public that they were prepared to do something
about the trusts, but it was far from clear that all the trusts were harmful or how to
distinguish the good ones from the bad. Congress thus drafted a statute that in effect
delegated the real task of defining the nation’s antitrust laws to the courts.169
The courts themselves, and least of all the Supreme Court, were not, and have
never been, immune from political influences. All of the Supreme Court’s early antitrust
167

See, for example, Oswald Knauth, 30 POL.SCI.Q. 378 (1915); Spurgeon Bell, 32 Q.J.ECON. 507

(1918) as well as Perelman, supra note 141.
168

For an example of the contemporaneous concerns about the growing political influence of the trusts, see

Edward F. Adams, The Trust in Politics, 34 OVERLAND MONTHLY AND OUT WEST MAGAZINE
120 (1899).
169

ELY, supra note 31.

70

decisions were handed down during the Chief Justiceship of Mellville W. Fuller. Fuller’s
own values have been described as “distinctly Jeffersonian,” and he was known to
strongly embrace the ideas of a limited government, laissez-faire capitalism, and liberty
of contract.170 Indeed, on balance the entire Fuller Court was decidedly conservative,
even for its time, and is still best known for its decision in Lochner. Most of the Justices’
social values and judicial philosophies were rooted in the mid-nineteenth century and illadapted to the changes that were transforming the nation as it turned the corner into the
twentieth. Yet the record suggests that the Fuller Court was a not only a “product of its
time and place …[but] …acted in accordance with the main currents of public
opinion”.171
Chief Justice Fuller recognized that constitutional decisions were highly political
and ultimately derived their force from the public‘s willingness to accept them. Indeed,
before he became Chief Justice he once suggested that important constitutional questions
could be put to the public at the ballot box.172 Although Fuller wrote relatively few
opinions himself, and, after E.C. Knight wrote none of the Court’s other antitrust
opinions, he played an important role in maintaining a high degree of collegiality on the
Court and in shaping as wide a range of agreement as possible among its members.173
Moreover, in spite of the Court’s social conservatism, its members understood that the
days of atomistic capitalism were quickly succumbing to the powerful new forces of
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industrial capitalism.174 The early antitrust decisions of the Fuller Court thus reflect the
contradictions inherent in its efforts to balance big business interests and the rights of
property against the public’s fears of the trusts and monopoly, and to identify the
appropriate role for the federal government in regulating the new industrial economy
without usurping the traditional authorities of the states.
In spite of the tensions, the Fuller Court’s antitrust decisions were remarkably
coherent. In fact, there was considerably more coherence to the Fuller Court’s antitrust
jurisprudence than some scholars have recognized. The decision in E.C. Knight has been
widely criticized, but it is important to remember that it was made on constitutional rather
than statutory grounds. The Court appears to have been deeply concerned about the
encroachment of federal statutes on spheres of state authority. Chief Justice Fuller, who
wrote the opinion, worried that if the federal commerce powers extended to local
manufacturing activities there would be little left for the states.175 In any case, Fuller
believed that local manufacturing activities were a matter rightly subject to state control
and that mergers of manufacturers would only have an indirect effect on interstate
commerce, certainly not enough of an effect to implicate the federal government’s
commerce powers.176 Given the prevailing views about the appropriate balance of federal
and state powers at the time, the decision in E.C. Knight was not particularly
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controversial.177
The Trans-Missouri Freight Association subsequently also challenged its
prosecution under the Sherman Act on commerce clause grounds, but its constitutional
argument was decisively rejected. The most striking aspect of Justice Peckham’s opinion
was its literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. But the outcome of the case was not
particularly controversial. In fact, the outcome was virtually compelled by the public’s
concerns about the growing power of the trusts. To that point, the Supreme Court had not
upheld a single prosecution under the Sherman Act. If it had declined to uphold the
government’s case in Trans-Missouri, the public would have rightly wondered whether
the Sherman Act had any teeth at all.178
The Court‘s application of the plain meaning doctrine was much more
controversial. But even that was not out of line with the public sentiment. The New
York Times frequently expressed concerns about the consequences of a literal
interpretation of the Sherman Act. Nonetheless, it was understanding and supportive of
the Supreme Court‘s position. As the Times noted in an article179 about two weeks after
177
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Trans-Missouri was handed down, the Court‘s literal reading of the Act was consonant
with the layman‘s interpretation of the Act. Indeed, the Court needed to maintain some
consistency in the application of the law. The problem was not with the Court, but with
Congress. There was nothing wrong with the Court’s interpretation of the law, it was the
law that was wrong, and Congress needed to change it. When the Court’s decision in
Joint Traffic was handed down, and reinforced a slightly modified but still very literal
reading of the Sherman Act, the Times observed that “the language of the decision is
simple, its reasoning convinces.”180
Nonetheless, there was considerable concern about the possibility that a per se
prohibition would apply to any contracts or combinations within the reach of the
Sherman Act.

Henry Clews, for instance, writing from a Wall Street insider’s

perspective, feared that it might make almost any kind of business transaction illegal.181
The New York Times would later write that the ruling created a cloud of doubt that hung
over many large scale business concerns.182

Nonetheless, when the circuit court of

appeal’s decision in Northern Securities was announced, the Times correctly predicted
that it would be upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court, and shrewdly observed that
“Judges, no less than legislators, have their eyes on the moving currents of public
opinion.”183 Public opinion was still decidedly in favor of further restraints on the
growing power of corporate business. Indeed, Henry Clews not only predicted that
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Northern Securities would be upheld on appeal, but that if it was not “the feeling of the
country is such that …the law will be so amended that such combinations will be
prevented“.184
The principal issue in Northern Securities was not whether the federal commerce
powers extended to the railways, but whether the federal government could regulate
transactions intended to create holding companies under state corporate laws.

The

Supreme Court’s disposition of the issue was almost a foregone conclusion. It was well
established long before the Sherman Act was passed that corporate law was within the
scope of state authorities, and that the states had the power to regulate and control
anticompetitive mergers conducted under their corporation laws. Nonetheless, by the
time the federal government brought its case against Northern Securities, most observers
had become convinced that it would be futile to wait for the states to use their powers to
regulate large corporate mergers.185 For one thing, the states were locked in a prisoner’s
dilemma in which their incentives to attract incorporations (and incorporation fees) away
from other states undermined their resolve to exercise their regulatory powers. Thus, the
states’ corporate laws were the product of a “race to the bottom” and came to reflect
corporate interests more than the public’s.186 To make matters worse, consolidations
often occurred through holding companies that were created under “foreign” states’
incorporation statutes and could not therefore be regulated in the states where the stocks
184
185
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came from.187
At the time the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the holding company device
was still relatively new. It was not yet clear whether the states would exercise their
powers to control its use for anticompetitive consolidations. Moreover, it is unlikely that
federal legislators had thought much about holding companies in drafting the Sherman
Act. Indeed, most observers initially thought that holding companies would be outside
the reach of the Sherman Act because they were not “combinations,” but comprised of
merely a single corporate individual.188 This presumption had faded by the time Northern
Securities was litigated, but it remained an important legal argument in the case.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court would have stood against the tide of public opinion if it
had upheld any of the challenges to the government’s case. Given the states’ dereliction
in the matter, if the Court had upheld Northern Securities’ appeal there would have been
no effective legal checks against the economic and political power of the trusts, and the
public’s growing concerns would almost certainly have mandated new federal
legislation.189
It is important to keep in mind that Northern Securities was not a commerce
clause case. Thus, even though it clearly brought the holding company device within the
reach of the Sherman Act, it did nothing to resolve the lingering questions about the
constitutional scope of federal powers. By the time the Northern Securities decision was
announced, most observers probably already felt that the federal commerce powers would
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extend to prosecutions of manufacturing holding companies as well as railroad holding
companies, but the question had still not been addressed by the Supreme Court. When it
did address the question in Swift, the Court was virtually compelled to extend the scope
of federal commerce powers for the same reason that it had been compelled to bring the
holding company device within the reach of the Sherman Act in Northern Securities. If it
had not extended the scope of federal powers there would have been a legal void. The
holding company device could have been used by manufacturers to create larger and
larger consolidations, completely unchecked by any effective regulatory control. The
Court needed a rationale for extending the reach of the Sherman Act, and the rationale
was provided by the stream of commerce doctrine. Although Swift has not received
much attention from antitrust scholars, it was the last logical step in the Supreme Court’s
early antitrust jurisprudence.
Swift was also a watershed in American constitutional law. Although it was
merely an antitrust case, the stream of commerce doctrine that Justice Holmes laid down
in his opinion provided the guiding light for the Court’s interpretation of the federal
government’s commerce powers at least until President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in
the 1930’s.190 Although Holmes did not invent the doctrine, he did persuade the rest of
the Court to adopt it, even though they had previously rejected it in Hopkins.191 This is
somewhat ironic, for Holmes was very skeptical about the Sherman Act and antitrust in
general.192 Along with many other academics and intellectuals at the time, he believed
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that the days of atomistic competition had passed, and that the trend toward industrial
concentration, and even monopolization, was inevitable.193 Nonetheless, Holmes was a
pragmatist, and he recognized that constitutional doctrine needed to be brought into line
with the realities of the modern industrial economy.194

V. CONCLUSIONS
Antitrust law remains as controversial today as ever. Indeed, the controversy
about the government’s early enforcement of the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court’s
early antitrust jurisprudence is still important to the way we view antitrust law today.
The conventional law and economics view of antitrust policy and the Supreme Court’s
early antitrust decisions casts a dour light on the entire antitrust agenda. But theories
need to be scrutinized and tested. It is all too easy to accept the conventional wisdom as
a matter of faith and simply cant hollow orthodoxies.
A careful reading of the Supreme Court’s earliest antitrust opinions in their
historical context casts considerable doubt on the thesis that either antitrust policy or the
Supreme Court’s antitrust decisions caused the Great Merger Movement. To be sure,
there was considerable confusion and uncertainty about the legal implications of many, if
not most, of the Court’s decisions. But we should keep in mind that there are diverse
opinions about many settled matters of law today. A hundred years from now, the
diversity of opinions today about Roe v Wade or Bakke might be misread as a widespread
disagreement about the law. The Supreme Court’s earliest antitrust opinions were not

193
194

FISS, supra note 42 at 143.
Gordon, supra note 131 at 278.

78

opaque, and they did not defy understanding.

Moreover, people at the turn of the

twentieth century were not fools. If the New York Times was able to decipher the
meaning of the Supreme Court‘s opinions (and all the evidence indicates that it was able
to do so) then so could sophisticated corporate attorneys and business leaders.
The trend toward consolidation in American business began before the Sherman
Act was passed. In fact, the Sherman Act was passed in response to the public‘s concerns
about the trend toward consolidation and the growing economic and political power of
large industrial combinations. The trust movement was driven by powerful economic
forces. The transportation revolution had dramatically increased the potential size of the
markets for many manufactured goods, and manufacturing firms were able to avail
themselves of important new technologies in adjusting to meet the demands. The new
technologies generated economies of scale and required significant capital investments.
But competition often resulted in over investment and excess capacity.

Hence the

investments were often very risky and business leaders sought ways of alleviating the
uncertainty and ensuring high rates of return.

They usually attempted to restrain

competition initially through some form of arms-length cooperation, such as a pricefixing agreement or trade association agreement. These usually broke down, however,
when the parties succumbed to the temptation to deviate from the agreements in the face
of severe hardship or simply greed. Their efforts to restrain competition thus usually
drove the parties into some form of consolidation. In the end, the preferred manner of
consolidation was a merger through the holding company device.
Antitrust jurisprudence in the years immediately after the Sherman Act was
enacted is better understood as a reaction to these powerful new economic forces and the
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trust movement than as a cause of them. The Supreme Court’s first antitrust decision in
E.C. Knight has been widely criticized. To be sure, the Court’s distinction between
manufacturing and commerce was anachronistic.

But a careful reading of the case

indicates that it did not constrain the scope of the Sherman Act nearly as much as the
conventional wisdom suggests. Moreover, it clearly applied to all restraints of trade and
not just mergers. This was later made evident by Hopkins, which was construed as a
matter of local commerce and therefore beyond the reach of the Sherman Act even
though it did not involve a merger. Somewhat after the fact, some observers attributed
the start of the Great Merger Movement to the Court’s holding, but their grounds for
doing so were weak at the time and just as weak today.
Public pressures had virtually compelled some kind of legislative response to the
trusts. Congress thus enacted the Sherman Act. But the Sherman Act remained toothless
for some time, and the public pressure for successful prosecutions grew. The federal
government initially focused its resources on price-fixing cases, mainly because these
were easier to prosecute. The Supreme Court’s literal interpretation of the Sherman Act
in Trans-Missouri did take many observers by surprise and was the subject of
considerable criticism. Yet the public was anxious for action, and the Court‘s literal
reading of the Sherman Act was consistent with the layman‘s understanding of what the
words meant. The conventional wisdom is that Trans-Missouri established a per se
prohibition against price-fixing agreements at a time when most mergers were believed to
be immune from prosecution. Trans-Missouri and, to a lesser extent, Joint Traffic, have
thus been credited by many with precipitating the steepest rise in merger activity
throughout the entire period.
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The “credit” is misplaced. Both Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic were railroad
cases. The Court’s sweeping literal interpretation of the Sherman Act applied to all direct
restraints of interstate trade, not just price-fixing agreements. Hence, it applied to any
consolidations within the Act’s reach, as well as any other restraints that went beyond
simple price-fixing agreements. It is not even clear whether the Court considered TransMissouri and Joint Traffic to be price-fixing cases. It had long been established that
railways were engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, absent any other limits on the
Sherman Act’s reach, Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic implied that railroad
consolidations would be subject to the same per se prohibition that price-fixing
agreements were subject to. It quickly became clear to most observers that TransMissouri and Joint Traffic created a cloud of legal doubt that hung over many
consolidations just as darkly as it did over less tightly integrated combinations. It is
difficult to see how these decisions alone could have precipitated the dramatic upswing in
merger activity at the turn of the twentieth century.
By the time the circuit court of appeal’s decision in favor of the government in
Northern Securities was handed down, most observers believed it would be upheld by the
Supreme Court. There was thus no particular reason why the Supreme Court’s decision
should have prompted an abrupt end to the Great Merger Movement.

Moreover,

Northern Securities was yet another railroad case, and the Court’s decision did nothing to
extend the reach of the Sherman Act beyond the railways. In fact, the Court did not
extend federal commerce powers until it handed down its decision in Swift, but by that
time the great rush of merger activity had already ended.

People may never have

believed that the Court would define the commerce clause so narrowly that it would place
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most mergers of manufacturers beyond the Sherman Act’s reach, or they may have come
to doubt whether the Court would continue to interpret the commerce clause as narrowly
as some scholars have implied, or they may have simply not cared. There is evidence to
support all three possibilities.

All three cast doubt on the conventional law and

economics view.
It is impossible therefore to tell a coherent story relating merger activity at the
turn of the twentieth century to the Supreme Court’s early antitrust decisions.

If

sophisticated corporate attorneys and business leaders understood the developments in
antitrust law as well as the New York Times, there is no way the cases could have
generated such sharp responses. People knew the risks of prosecution were slight. They
knew that criminal penalties were unlikely.

The reality is that the consolidation

movement was compelled by underlying technological and economic forces. Those same
underlying forces influenced the way the Supreme Court responded to the legal questions
raised in its early antitrust cases. Most of the important questions were constitutional,
and the Supreme Court therefore handed down some very important constitutional
decisions.

These no doubt influenced the subsequent evolution of American

constitutional law and the American polity.
One of the unfortunate consequences of all the attention that scholars have given
to the effect of antitrust on the Great Merger Movement is that it has distracted attention
from the role that the Court’s early antitrust decisions played in the development of
constitutional doctrine. The underlying technological and economic forces that gave rise
to a national economy also created pressures for a regulatory response. In the absence of
any possibility of effective state control, the Supreme Court was virtually compelled to
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extend the scope of the federal government’s commerce powers and bring a wide range
of business activities within the scope of federal regulation. The irony in the end is that
the same Court that handed down Lochner, and which therefore came, in the minds of
many, to stand for the principles of limited government and the rights of private property,
was instrumental in expanding the scope of federal power and helping to lay the
foundations of the modern American system of business regulation.

